Middle East Crises Then and Now

Guest Opinion

U.S. and Israeli forces attacked Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, rekindling memories of the Middle East Crisis of 1958.

Then, Egypt and Syria’s United Arab Republic (UAR) threatened to overthrow Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, nations strategically important to America and Britain. From 1957 to 1959, I was one of five Marines providing security at the American Embassy in Amman, Jordan. My article, “Crisis in Retrospect,” published in the December 1973 Marine Corps Gazette, and my memories will highlight 1958’s crisis, origins, endpoints, and lessons below.

As 1958 unfolded, Ambassador Lester D. Mallory departed, leaving chargé d’affaires Thomas K. Wright in charge. Increasing Jordan’s defense capabilities, in April America purchased British Hawker Hunter aircraft; the Royal Air Force provided training

Egypt’s President, Arab Nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser, led the UAR that was threatening Jordan and Iraq, with support from the Soviet Union. Jordan’s King Hussein and Iraq’s King Faisal combined their anti-UAR military forces into the Arab Federation (AF). On May 26, Hussein and Faisal celebrated Arab Army Day in Amman. On July 14, Faisal was assassinated, collapsing the federation. In Jordan, a military revolt further endangered Hussein.

Wright’s July 16 declassified message to the Department of State indicated Hussein had summoned him and Britain’s chargé d’affaires, R. Heath Mason, to the palace. Based on guarantees to maintain Jordan’s independence, Hussein, heeding his prime minister’s and army’s commanding general’s advice, requested U.S. and UK help.

Confirming intelligence, and to avoid another Iraq, Wright and Mason agreed to Hussein’s immediate need. Calling Parliament into night session, Hussein conveyed his decision, stating his “trusted friends” would help.

Concerned that troops would not arrive in time, and to reduce signs of additional trouble, Wright planned a “quiet” American evacuation. Although a leak occurred, the evacuation succeeded.

Israel’s Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, authorized British aircraft to overfly Israel. Britain’s Royal Parachute Regiment landed para units in Jordan on July 17. Their objective was to maintain order and help Hussein survive, which they did. Diplomacy worked!

Meanwhile, Lebanon’s President Camille Chamoun faced a grave situation. Alarmed Iraq had fallen and fearing his opposition, UAR, and subversive elements infiltrating men and weapons that would topple his government, Chamoun requested immediate assistance from President Dwight D. Eisenhower (Ike).

Ike, knowing politics, diplomacy, and war, pondered Lebanon’s situation while considering his military service chiefs’ concerns. Among them, Soviet airpower and advances in technology, France’s inability to control Algeria’s resistance, and supplying a force 3,800 miles from Atlantic naval bases.

Given Chamoun’s dire situation, Ike knew he needed authority to act. Adding international policy to his planning process, he coordinated with the UN, stating support for its position to withdraw American forces rapidly. The UN and U.S. government jointly became privy to impending operations.

Congress approved using force against armed aggression to preserve a Middle East nation’s independence. The UN’s investigation found threats to Lebanon internal; Ike’s analysis determined them external. U.S. policy conflicted with Eisenhower’s and Chamoun’s needs.

Lebanon’s explosive situation, however, confirmed the Eisenhower Doctrine. Congressional approval authorized military intervention for both indirect and armed aggression.

Although having authority, Ike informed 22 ranking Republicans and Democrats, ensuring he coordinated his decision with Congress. Then, to General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he ordered, “Send ’em in!”

Marines landed unopposed over Beirut’s beaches on July 15. Like the paratroopers, Marines calmed a tense situation, preventing Chamoun’s downfall with minimum casualties. Marines departed on October 25, the paras on October 29, essentially ending the brief 1958 crisis.

These two crises have differences and similarities. Looking back, in 1958 sovereign nations requested U.S. and UK military force to prevent their overthrow. In 2026, the U.S. and Israel struck Iran to destroy its leadership and military capabilities, an act of war.

A 1958 war would have been conventional. The UAR lacked sufficient forces to challenge America and Britain militarily, and thus stood back. In 2026, Iran, unable to stop the U.S. and Israel by itself, practices hybrid warfare. With regionally located proxies, like Hezbollah, using drones, missiles and cyber technologies, Iran causes operational disruptions and international havoc.

Eisenhower defined objectives and endpoints. Americans and British leaders in Jordan mirrored his planning and execution. Diplomacy was center stage. Ike’s assurance to quickly withdraw gained UN support and U.S. and UK efforts convinced Israel to authorize overflight so paras could land in Jordan more quickly.

Trump and Netanyahu have yet to define goals and outcomes clearly, and their threats replace diplomacy and coordination. Ike garnered Congressional authority to act and kept Congress informed, keys to political and legal affirmations. Trump ignores these functions.

1958 outcomes: leaders acted professionally and efficiently, prevented coups, averted war, minimized casualties, overcame threats, and accomplished intended endpoints peacefully.

2026 outcomes: unending U.S. and Israeli attacks are causing casualties, economic loss, energy disruption, and worsening trust and opposition worldwide. Iran is responding destructively. No apparent end is in sight!

Retired Marine General James Mattis said, “No war is over until the enemy says it’s over.” To Trump and Netanyahu, it appears the lessons of 1958 have gone unlearned and unheeded.

Born in Bridgeport, CT, Bill Steeves, Ed.D., is a retired U.S. Marine (1954-1974) and retired educator in academe and industry.

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